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Introduction 
 
After a relatively brief interruption in access to the world’s financial markets in late 2008 
and early 2009, Latin America has been experiencing a renewed wave of capital inflows 
– so much so that the issue of how best to ride this wave has become a major policy 
concern. The intensity of investor interest in the emerging markets generally, and in 
Latin America in particular, has been heightened by the prospect of renewed monetary 
expansion in the United States, and thus by the outlook for persistently low interest 
rates and bond yields. The search for fixed-income returns higher than the 1-5% range 
that prevails in much of Europe, as well as in Japan and North America, has now led 
bond investors to venture into increasingly risky territory, such as single-B-rated credits 
– Argentina among them.1
 
  
 
                                                 
1 Ratings for Argentina quoted throughout correspond to those assigned to foreign-currency bonds issued by the 
national government. 
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This is why several single-B-rated Argentine corporations, provinces and the 
municipality of Buenos Aires have been able to issue bonds this year for the first time in 
over a decade, raising almost $3 billion through the end of October at yields mostly in 
the range of 9½ % to 12½%.2 And recently, an Argentine property developer completed 
the first initial public offering of shares in Buenos Aires in more than two years, with two-
thirds of the stocks sold to foreign investors as global depositary receipts.3
 
 Evidently, 
even equity investors are jumping on the bandwagon. 
The return of Argentina to the world capital markets is a watershed event worth noting 
and discussing. After all, this is one of the few emerging-market countries characterized 
by nearly a decade’s worth of capital flight measured in the many billions of dollars per 
annum – namely, a place from which most investors have been fleeing for safer and 
more attractive destinations elsewhere, much like investors have done (on a larger 
scale) in Venezuela.4 It is also a country whose national government has defaulted on 
its loan and bond obligations numerous times in recent decades, and despite having 
failed to fully cure its 2001 default to official and private creditors, has stated its intention 
of returning to the international markets to issue a sovereign bond as soon as it finds it 
sufficiently attractive to do so.5
 
 So the question of whether financial intermediaries and 
institutional investors should welcome Argentina back to the global capital markets is 
certainly relevant – especially for those with short or partial memories who may be 
tempted to rush in without a full understanding of the risks involved. 
 
At First Sight 
A bird’s eye view of Argentina could easily lead some to believe that Argentina has 
come such a long way from its troubled past that its creditworthiness might be 
underappreciated by the rating agencies, and that its riskiness may be exaggerated by 
the bond markets. After all, Argentina is a member of the G-20 club of leading nations; it 
ranks among the top 30 economies in the world; it is a stable and peaceful democracy; 
and many of its main economic indicators look very healthy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Drew Benson, “Arcor Tops Government in Bond Market With Overseas Sales,” Bloomberg News, October 21, 
2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/arcor-tops-government-in-bond-market-with-
overseas-sales-argentina-credit.html. 
3 Eduardo Thompson, “Argentina's Two-Year IPO Drought Ends as Real-Estate Developer Sells Stock,” Bloomberg 
News, October 29, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-29/argentina-s-two-year-ipo-
drought-ends-as-real-estate-developer-sells-stock.html. 
4 This author’s estimates, based on official balance of payments data, are that net capital outflows excluding 
government and central bank transactions, and errors and omissions, averaged over $8 billion per annum in 
Argentina during 2004-2009. The Institute of International Finance estimates that capital flight (“net resident 
lending abroad”) averaged nearly $7 billion per year during the same period. 
5 Drew Benson and Ben Bain, “Fernandez Rejects 8% Yield Overseas to Pay 12% in Pesos,” Bloomberg News, 
September 28, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-28/fernandez-rejects-8-yield-
overseas-to-pay-12-in-pesos-argentina-credit.html. 
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For example, Argentina’s per capita income measured in current dollars, a variable that 
usually correlates quite well with sovereign ratings because it is a general measure of 
capacity to pay foreign-currency obligations, has recuperated strongly in recent years. It 
now exceeds $8,000 (see Figure 1), such that Argentina currently fits comfortably within 
the range of per capita incomes of developing countries that are rated BBB/Baa1-
Baa3.6
 
 
Fig. 1: Per Capita Income (US$ per year)     Fig. 2: Unemployment Rate (% as of mid-year) 
 
 
 
Source Fig. 1: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance and Central Bank of Argentina (2010 consensus 
forecasts). 
Source Fig. 2: Argentina INDEC (EPH Puntual 1990-2002, EPH Continua 2003-2010), for May or June. 
 
Argentina’s vigorous economic recovery from the protracted and deep recession of 
2000-2002 is reflected in the steady drop in urban unemployment, which has come 
down from above 20% and has settled at around 8% during the eight quarters through 
mid-2010 (see Figure 2). These are very good levels, last seen in the early 1990s 
before the economy was restructured and many low value-added jobs in inefficient 
companies disappeared. This is another achievement that normally supports a country’s 
creditworthiness, because it correlates with higher private-sector incomes and 
government revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Statistical Handbook: Country Credit, May 2010, p. 11. The mean per capita 
income for Baa1-Baa3 developing countries was $8,100 in 2009; Argentina’s per capita income is much higher on a 
purchasing-power-adjusted basis (around $14,000), and also falls within the Baa1-Baa3 range as per Moody’s. Ibid, 
pp. 16-18. 
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Argentina’s economy has been helped by a boom in the prices of its commodity exports, 
stimulating greater investment and output, particularly in export-oriented agriculture.7
 
 
Indeed, export prices and volumes have each averaged about 65% higher during 2008-
2010 than in 1999-2000 (see Figure 3). As a result, the country’s merchandise export 
earnings have more than doubled, from around $25 billion per annum a decade ago to a 
yearly average of over $60 billion during 2008-2010 (see Figure 4). This is the kind of 
noteworthy expansion in hard-currency earnings that improves several of the ratios 
(e.g., external debt to exports) that are usually calculated to help assess a country’s 
creditworthiness. 
Fig. 3: Export Prices and Volumes (1993=100)  Fig. 4: Merchandise Exports (US$ billions) 
 
   
 
Source Fig. 3: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance. 
Source Fig. 4: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance and Central Bank of Argentina (2010 consensus 
forecasts). 
 
 
The export boom has generated a significant expansion of government revenues, 
because commodity exports have been taxed directly, and once the export-led recovery 
trickled down to urban consumers, a virtuous cycle of higher private-sector incomes and 
augmented government revenues and spending ensued. Indeed, Argentina has never  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Argentina’s terms of foreign trade (incorporating the evolution of both export and import prices) during the past 
three years have been the most favorable in nearly three decades. See Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public 
Finance, Secretariat of Economic Policy, Economic Information: External Sector, available at 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html. The share of agriculture in nominal GDP 
more than doubled in 2002-2004, to almost 10% from under 4.5% in 1999-2001. See Ibid, Economic Information: 
Economic Activity. 
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before seen as great an expansion of government income as in recent years, such that 
revenues have grown to the equivalent of more than 33% of GDP from an average of 
around 21% of GDP in the late 1990s (see Figure 5).8 The fast pace of revenue growth 
has allowed for a massive reduction of the burden that government obligations – 
whether paid or in arrears – imposed on the government’s revenue base (see Figure 6). 
This sovereign creditworthiness indicator, which has now dropped to around 150% from 
a peak of nearly 800% in 2002, is actually below the levels prevailing in the late 1990s, 
when the sovereign was rated BB/BB/Ba3.9
 
  
Fig. 5: Government Revenues (% of GDP)*      Fig. 6: Government Debt (% of Revenues)** 
 
    
 
* Net of tax rebates and inclusive of mandatory social security contributions and provincial revenues; 2010 estimate 
based on January-September year-on-year revenue growth and consensus GDP forecasts as of September 2010. 
Source Fig. 5: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance and Central Bank of Argentina (2010 consensus 
forecasts). 
** Includes debts that were not tendered to the exchanges of 2005 and 2010; 2010 estimate based on the mid-2010 
debt/revenues ratio, incorporating an estimate of the effect of the 2010 debt exchange. 
Source Fig. 6: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, Asociación Argentina de Presupuesto y 
Administración Financiera Pública and author’s calculations. 
 
The export bonanza, which has made it possible for Argentina to run substantial 
surpluses in its foreign trade (averaging about $15 billion per annum during 2002-2009), 
despite a surge in imports, has more than compensated for the previously-mentioned 
net capital outflows. If Argentina had had a market-based, exchange-rate regime, the 
resulting net influx of foreign exchange would have led to a meaningful appreciation of 
the Argentine peso. However, it has been government policy to have the Central Bank 
of Argentina intervene frequently in the currency market in order to keep the peso (ARS) 
weaker than otherwise. In the five years to September 30, 2010, the ARS has 
depreciated in nominal terms by 36%, from ARS2.91/USD to ARS 3.96/USD, a period  
                                                 
8 The revenue figures include pension contributions from employers and employees, but the renationalization of 
the pension regime in late 2008 probably accounts for less than one fifth of the ten percentage-point increase in 
the ratio of revenues to GDP. 
9 Sovereign foreign-currency ratings as per Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. Moody’s 
downgraded Argentina to B1 in October 1999; the others first downgraded it in late 2000 (Standard & Poor’s) and 
in early 2001 (Fitch). 
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during which most emerging-market currencies, including those of Argentina’s 
neighbors, have appreciated. 10
 
 
One result of frequent central bank intervention to mop up excess dollars coming into 
Argentina has been a major accumulation of official international reserves. Despite 
having had to transfer periodically many billions of dollars out of reserves to the 
government, the central bank has seen its hoard of foreign exchange boosted to more 
than $50 billion since July of this year, up sharply from less than $20 billion prior to 
2005. As can be seen in Figure 7, and as is true about its fiscal revenues, Argentina’s 
official international reserves have likewise reached their highest point in contemporary 
history.  
 
Until recent years, the country’s total foreign debt, and the government’s own 
obligations to non-resident investors, used to be a huge multiple of the central bank’s 
international reserves. Now the country’s external debt liabilities are two-and-a-half 
times the level of reserves, a fraction of their magnitude even in the late 1990s (nearly 
six times the level of reserves), when Argentina was deemed to be a much better credit 
(see Figure 8). At these levels, the country’s foreign debt is once again compatible with 
higher sovereign credit ratings.11
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Official International Reserves   Fig. 8: External Debt (% of international 
(US$ billions)         reserves)* 
 
   
 
 
* Excludes government bonds owned by non-residents that were not tendered into the debt exchanges of 2005 and 2010. 
Source Fig. 7: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (1991-2010) and International Monetary Fund (1980-
1990). 
Source Fig. 8: Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance. 
 
                                                 
10 During this same 5-year period, the Brazilian Real (BRL) appreciated in nominal terms by 24%, and the Chilean 
peso (CLP) by 9%, versus the USD. 
11 According to Moody’s, the mean ratio of external debt to official international reserves for Baa1-Baa3 
developing countries was 300% in 2009, and for Ba1-Ba3 countries it was 259%. See Moody’s Investors Service, op. 
cit., pp. 201-202. 
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A Closer Look 
There is a great deal of country risk that is not captured by these indicators, however, 
so it would be naïve to rush to the conclusion that Argentina is a creditworthy or 
relatively safe place in which to invest. 
 
First, the government has been spending virtually all its enormous revenue windfall, 
such that in fact there are hardly any extra, genuine resources available to support the 
existing – or any new – public indebtedness. The Argentine authorities have not been 
publishing comprehensive data on the public-sector accounts, but whatever statistics 
they do release for the central government show, despite the windfall, a string of only 
modest fiscal surpluses during 2002-2008 – and then a small deficit for 2009, when the 
economy and tax revenues went through a temporary downturn.  
 
However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been publishing a more 
comprehensive data set that includes provincial government finances, and where 
spending is recorded on an accrual, rather than cash, basis – namely, it includes all  
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payments that are contractually due to be made by the government. As can be seen in 
Figure 9, the IMF’s figures show a string of operating deficits rather than any surpluses. 
This is consistent with the fact that the public debt has grown from mid-2003 until mid-
2010 by the equivalent of $37 billion (net of all debt forgiveness), which is equivalent to 
around 15% of average GDP during that 7-year period.12 Therefore, the impressive 
trend in tax revenues to GDP, or in the ratio of government debt to revenues highlighted 
previously, paints a completely misleading picture of Argentina’s renewed capacity to 
pay its domestic or foreign obligations. The growth in spending apparently has been 
channeled as follows: the civil-service headcount in the central government has 
increased by one-third from the 1999-2002 average; subsidies to consumers (mainly on 
energy) have increased by at least three percentage points of GDP; and other forms of 
social spending have likewise risen by over three percentage points. This has happened 
during a period of rapid GDP growth, such that all spending categories have increased 
to a greater or lesser extent, and government expenditures as a whole have quadrupled 
in nominal terms from 2002 through 2009.13
 
 
Fig. 9: Fiscal Accounts (% of GDP)14
 
 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund and Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Perspectiv@as, “La dinámica de la deuda pública en la era K,” September 24, 2010, available from the author. 
13 Spending at the level of the Non-Financial Public Sector was ARS 71 billion in 2002 and reached ARS 327 billion in 
2009. See Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, Secretariat of Economic Policy, Economic 
Information: Public Finance, available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html; 
Gasto Público Consolidado, available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/docs/gp_cons.xls, and Asociación 
Argentina de Presupuesto y Administración Financiera Pública, Estadísticas Fiscales, Capítulo VI, Ocupación en el 
Sector Público, Table VI.2, available at http://www.asap.org.ar/images/stories/file/estadisticas/cap6/6.2.xls. 
14 Expanded sources: IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Western  Hemisphere, May 2010, p. 60, and October 2010, 
p. 81; Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (MECON), Secretariat of Economic Policy, Economic 
Information: Public Finance, Table A6.1 (A), available at 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html; and Asociación Argentina de Presupuesto y 
Administración Financiera Pública, Estadísticas Fiscales, Capítulo I, Ahorro-Inversión-Financiamiento, Table I.2.2., 
based on MECON, available at http://www.asap.org.ar/images/stories/file/estadisticas/cap1/1.2.2.xls. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E
As per IMF:
Public sector revenues 29.9 31.5 33.4 33.9 34.6
Public sector spending 31.0 33.6 33.7 37.6 38.1
Overall balance -1.1 -2.1 -0.3 -3.7 -3.5
As per Argentina:
Overall balance* 1.8 1.1 1.4 -0.6
Overall balance** 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.0
* Non-Financial Public Sector.
** National Public Sector.
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The provincial and municipal governments that have issued bonds abroad, or might do 
so in the near future, are all rated single-B, and all indications are that their financial 
situation is precarious indeed. As a group, their financial performance has tended to  
deteriorate: they ran a collective overall budgetary surplus equivalent to 1% of GDP in 
2004, then moved to a balance in 2006-2007, and they have been in deficit ever 
since.15
 
 It is troubling to see them issue debt in dollars that carry double-digit coupons 
when there is no reasonable assurance that their revenues will grow at double-digit 
rates during the life of those bonds. 
Second, serious allegations have been made in recent years about the accuracy and 
integrity of official inflation data in Argentina, casting doubt on all kinds of economic 
indicators that use price indexes as a deflator, as in the case of real GDP, real wages, 
real interest rates and real exchange rates. Numerous private-sector estimates of 
inflation, as well as official inflation measures computed by several provincial 
governments, point to a much higher inflation rate than calculated and published by the 
national statistical agency. The agency, known for its acronym INDEC, was purged of 
key staff in early 2007, allegedly for the individuals’ unwillingness to keep fudging the 
numbers to keep reported inflation down.16 Numerous economic consultants, 
universities and business groups have started a veritable cottage industry sampling 
consumer prices and calculating alternative inflation figures. The credibility gap has 
become so large that, in the IMF’s leading publication, the World Economic Outlook, 
Argentina is the only country in the world whose inflation and GDP statistics are 
accompanied by a footnote explaining that the numbers cited have been challenged by 
private analysts.17
 
 
According to the government’s figures, inflation in Argentina (using year-on-year 
monthly figures) has averaged 8.4% per annum during the period from January 2007 
until September 2010. In contrast, according to the Fundación de Investigaciones 
Económicas Lationamericanas (FIEL), which is a highly reputable, business-sponsored 
economic research institute in Buenos Aires, inflation during that period has averaged  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Asociación Argentina de Presupuesto y Administración Financiera Pública, op. cit., Capítulo I, Ahorro-Inversión-
Financiamiento, Table I.5.1.2, available at 
http://www.asap.org.ar/images/stories/file/estadisticas/cap1/1.5.1.2.xls. 
16 “Economics for Dummies,” The Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2007. 
17 See, for example, IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2010, p. 80, 183-184 and 189-190. 
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20.5% – a time-and-a-half difference. As can be seen in Figure 10, the gap between the 
two measures of inflation has been persistently large, and other independent estimates 
of inflation produced in the capital city and in distant provinces yield a discrepancy that 
is roughly of the same magnitude. The passage of time means that the cumulative 
difference in inflation statistics has grown very large (see Figure 11): according to the 
government, prices have gone up by less than 50% since the beginning of 2006, but as 
reckoned by FIEL and many other alternative sources, prices have actually skyrocketed 
by almost 130%. 
 
Fig. 10: Inflation (% year-on-year)                     Fig. 11: Consumer price indexes (April  
    2008 = 100) 
 
  
 
Source Fig. 10 & 11: INDEC and FIEL. 
 
The implications are serious. The Argentine authorities believe that their fiscal and 
monetary policies are sound and appropriate; the great majority of independent 
economic analysts and the IMF itself, on the other hand, disagree and think that these 
policies have been highly expansionary and downright imprudent.18
 
 Clearly, inflation 
measured in single digits tends to support the government’s position, whereas inflation 
measured continuously in double digits provides ammunition to the critics. If inflation is 
indeed running very high, it suggests that the government would be well advised to slow 
down the growth of public spending, and that the central bank should tighten monetary 
policy by moving away from an informal exchange-rate target, because its purchases of 
dollars have contributed – despite costly sterilization operations – to an excessive 
monetary expansion. Indeed, the monetary aggregates have been growing at year-on-
year rates of over 25% as of late, well beyond what is deemed prudent if inflation is 
indeed running at the relatively slower pace the government says it is. 
 
                                                 
18 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Western Hemisphere, October 2010, pp. 29-30. 
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Inflation running at close to 10%, never mind at close to 30%, also undermines the case 
for regarding Argentina as creditworthy. Inflation rates have historically correlated quite 
well with sovereign credit ratings; in general, the higher the inflation, the lower the 
ratings, especially in years past when the worldwide dispersion of inflation rates was 
much greater than nowadays. Still, the mean annual inflation rate for investment-grade 
developing countries was 4% in 2009, whereas for single-B countries it was 6%; indeed, 
the single-B category is the only one that encompasses half-a-dozen countries with 
double-digit inflation, Argentina and Venezuela among them.19
 
 They probably belong 
there, because high-inflation countries are usually characterized by imprudent fiscal and 
monetary policies, feature unsustainable exchange rates and tend to engender social 
and political unrest – sooner or later.  
Moreover, higher-than-officially-recognized inflation in Argentina has cheated domestic 
and international investors who held inflation-adjusted (so-called CER-indexed), peso-
denominated bonds, large quantities of which were issued in 2002-2004 paying 2% plus 
the inflation adjustment. In 2005-2006, before inflation allegedly got out of control, these 
inflation “protected” securities accounted for more than 40% of Argentine government 
debt outstanding, but by now the proportion has fallen to less than 25% of total, as 
investors shunned them because they realized that they would not be compensated 
appropriately.20
 
 As investor appetite for CER-indexed debt dried up, government bonds, 
which pay a floating interest rate (BADLAR), have taken their place. 
Third, investors must be mindful of the implications of Argentina having yet to fully cure 
its massive default to private and official creditors. Earlier this year, the government 
reopened its punishing debt exchange of 2005 and a number of holdout bondholders 
capitulated and accepted the steep losses and new long-term bonds offered by 
Argentina. They had held out in the understandable hope that the country’s strong 
economic recovery of recent years, and the government’s historic revenue bonanza, 
would have led to an improved offer such that they would not have to renounce up to 
two-thirds of their principal claim. By now, about 92% of bondholders have tendered 
their old, defaulted bonds, either in 2005 or earlier this year, but the remainder, who are 
owed more than $16 billion (including accrued interest), now constitute a hard core of 
unpaid creditors.21 Many of them have won court judgments worth billions of dollars 
against Argentina, and are pursuing every remedy legally available to enforce them.22
                                                 
19 Moody’s Investors Service, op. cit., pp. 30-32. 
  
20 Argentina Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, Secretariat of Finance, National Bureau of Public Credit, 
Public Debt Report as of 06-30-2010, Table A.20, available at 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/sfinan/documentos/deuda_publica_30-06-2010.xls. 
21 The government’s calculation of principal and interest due to holdout bond investors appears in Ibid, Table 
A.1.2. 
22 For example, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Griesa granted a court order in May freezing $3.1 billion in 
Argentine assets in the United States at the request of NML Capital Ltd. and Kenneth Dart’s EM Ltd., and a U.S. 
appeals court upheld that order in August. Lately, NML asked the same court to enforce “equal treatment” (pari 
passu) among Argentina’s creditors, claiming the country is wrongly paying other debts before those of the holders 
of defaulted bonds, an argument with potentially widespread ramifications. See Andrew M. Harris, “Argentine 
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Should the government decide to come back to the international bond markets, the 
creditors could conceivably attempt to block any such issuance until Argentina satisfies 
its outstanding judgments, and failing that, the creditors probably would try to attach any 
of the proceeds from the sale of new securities before they reach the government’s 
pockets. 
 
Argentina is also in protracted arrears to certain foreign commercial banks and 
suppliers, in the amount of $850 million, and it has not paid on several awards for nearly 
$1 billion entered against the government as a result of arbitrations under the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).23 Moreover, there 
are a number of additional cases making their way through ICSID that could result in 
multi-billion-dollar awards. At present, there are 27 cases pending against Argentina.  
They represent more than one-fifth of all cases currently before ICSID and a whopping 
84% of all cases brought against any of the G-20 member nations.24
 
 All of these claims 
against Argentina constitute actual or contingent liabilities that could cause 
complications for new investors down the road, and which eventually will have to be 
settled one way or another. 
A related concern is the fact that Argentina has not cured its default on debts to the 
Paris Club of official bilateral lenders, who are owed close to $7 billion, of which more 
than $5 billion is in arrears.25 Indeed, Argentina is the only G-20 member government 
that is in default on its loan obligations to its fellow members – and it has been in default 
to them for nearly a decade. In recent weeks, the Argentine authorities have stated their 
intention to negotiate with the Paris Club and to reach a rescheduling agreement within 
a few months.26
                                                                                                                                                             
Bondholder Asks U.S. Court for ‘Equal Treatment’ Among Creditors,” Bloomberg News, October 20, 2010, available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/argentine-bondholder-asks-u-s-court-for-equal-treatment-
among-creditors.html. 
 Until this becomes a reality, however, investors contemplating 
purchasing a new global bond issued by Argentina should be mindful that, if and when 
the Argentine government and its creditor counterparts negotiate a restructuring of 
these past-due amounts, the Paris Club will likely apply its principle of “comparable 
treatment” to private creditors. For instance, when countries as diverse as Indonesia 
(1998), Pakistan (1999), Russia (1999) and the Dominican Republic (2004) 
encountered financial difficulties and reached out to their official creditors, the debt relief  
23 Op. cit., Public Debt Report as of 06-30-2010, Table A.3, and Republic of Argentina prospectus subject to 
completion dated January 28, 2010, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under Schedule B of 
the Securities Act of 1933, pp. 11-12. 
24 ICSID, List of Pending Cases, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending. 
25 Ibid., Public Debt Report as of 06-30-2010, Table A.3. Argentina reports owing $6.6 billion and the Paris Club 
reports being owed $6.9 billion, see Paris Club, Annual Report 2009, p. 44, available at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/communication/rapport-annuel-d/2009-rapport-
annuel1218/downloadFile/file/RapportAnnuel_AnnualReport_2009.pdf. 
26 Drew Benson and Rodrigo Orihuela, “Argentina's Paris Club Debt to be Resolved by Early 2011, Lorenzino Says,” 
Bloomberg News, November 17, 2010 , available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/argentina-s-
paris-club-debt-to-be-resolved-by-early-2011-lorenzino-says.html. 
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they obtained from the Paris Club was conditioned on securing comparable relief from 
their bankers and bondholders. This was true even when debt to private creditors was 
small or was not yet falling due, as in the cases of Pakistan and the Dominican 
Republic.27
 
 Therefore, potential foreign investors in (and lenders to) Argentina are likely 
to become embroiled in a restructuring of their claims as a concession to any future 
accord between Argentina and its official creditors. For all practical purposes, new 
creditors to Argentina have a target on their back. 
Fourth, the controversy over the true rate of inflation is part of a larger picture of lack of 
transparency in Argentina. Argentina is also the only member of the G-20 that refuses to 
abide by its treaty obligations to the International Monetary Fund, which include allowing 
the IMF to inspect its books and evaluate the country’s economic performance and 
policies – especially its exchange-rate policies under a so-called Article IV Consultation. 
The IMF is supposed to hold bilateral discussions with its member governments usually 
every year, but Argentina has not hosted the Fund since 2006. Apparently, the 
authorities in Buenos Aires do not wish to be questioned on their economic statistics, 
nor to be criticized for their economic policies, including their manipulation of the 
exchange rate.28
 
 
The country is also the only member of the G-20 that has just been put on probation by 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body whose purpose is 
the development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF Plenary Meeting just 
recently “expressed its disappointment and serious concern regarding Argentina’s 
failure to implement an adequate and effective AML/CFT [anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing] system and will engage closely with Argentina to ensure that 
it quickly rectifies the identified deficiencies.”29
 
 Argentina has either failed to comply, or 
has complied only partially, with 42 out of the 49 standards recommended by the FATF. 
The FATF complete report, to be published shortly, apparently denounces corruption  
 
                                                 
27 In return for a Paris Club debt rescheduling of payments due in 1999-2000 (along Houston terms), Pakistan was 
forced to reschedule three Eurobonds maturing during 1999-2000 even though the amounts involved were 
relatively small. And in exchange for a Paris Club debt rescheduling of some arrears and payments due in 2004 
(along Classic terms), the Dominican Republic was required to reschedule a Eurobond maturing in 2006 and 
another one falling due in 2013. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, “Debt Relief by Private and Official Creditors: The 
Record Speaks,” International Finance, Summer 2007, p. 202. 
28 In late November, the Argentine authorities requested IMF technical assistance on the design and methodology 
of a new national consumer price index, but the main problem is not the absence of such a comprehensive index, 
but rather the manipulation of the 440 prices which serve as inputs for the existing index for the greater Buenos 
Aires metropolitan area. 
29 FATF, “Outcomes of the FATF Plenary Meeting, Paris, 20-22 October 2010,” available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/21/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_46252373_1_1_1_1,00.html. A full report on the case of 
Argentina will be published by the FATF in the weeks to come, but the Executive Summary, which details the 42 
standards that Argentina is not in full compliance, has been posted and is available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/51/5/46336120.pdf. 
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and impunity in Argentina, and is the harshest ever published by that high-level group 
on any of its member governments.30
 
  
Part of the problem may be rooted in Argentina’s default on its foreign obligations, its 
ongoing effort to prevent state funds from falling into the hands of disgruntled creditors, 
and its noncompliance with court judgments and arbitral awards. As a result, the 
government has had to minimize its bank accounts abroad, make payments in cash 
(e.g., to its own diplomats abroad), move money in roundabout ways through the 
international financial system, and  leave as small a paper trail as possible. 
 
Moreover, many stories of official corruption and maladministration, or of suspected 
illicit or improper activities on the part of government officials, have come to light in 
recent years in Argentina – something else for potential investors to consider, 
particularly since neither the government nor the judiciary has been keen to investigate 
(never mind prosecute) them. To recall just two of the most prominent episodes, the late 
President Néstor Kirchner used to boast that when he was the governor of the province 
of Santa Cruz in the 1990s, he had “safeguarded” hundreds of millions of dollars of 
provincial funds by moving them into Swiss banks ahead of the peso’s devaluation in 
2002. However, there has never been a full disclosure of how much was shifted 
overseas, how much has been repatriated to Santa Cruz, or what has happened to the 
earnings on those deposits abroad. Earlier this year, a former vice governor of that 
province denounced Mr. Kirchner for having stolen some of those funds, but various 
petitions for an investigation of the matter have come to nothing.31
 
  
The presidential campaign of the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was marred by the 
“suitcase scandal,” which involved the arrival into Argentina of nearly $800,000 in cash 
carried in a suitcase by someone flying in from Venezuela on a jet chartered by an 
Argentine state-owned company. Several individuals connected to the episode were 
later charged in the United States with various crimes and were tried and sentenced to 
prison. The authorities in Argentina and Venezuela did not pursue an investigation, 
perhaps because a member of President Kirchner’s cabinet, who remains in that post 
until now under President Fernández de Kirchner, was allegedly linked to secret money 
transfers from Venezuela to Argentina.32
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Hugo Alconada Mon, “Lavado: ultimátum para la Argentina,” La Nación, October 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1317449. 
31 La Nación, “El ministro de Economía santacruceño negó que se hayan gastado los fondos,” May 28, 2010, 
available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1269479. The most extensive documentation on this 
matter appears in MDZ Online, “Fondos de Santa Cruz, los documentos secretos del kirchnerismo,” May 28, 2010, 
available at http://www.mdzol.com/0/vnc/imprimir.vnc?id=212706.  
32 Mort Lucoff and David Voreacos, “Venezuelan Agent Gets 4-Year Term in U.S. in Suitcase Scandal,” Bloomberg 
News, March 17, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ab4eYiOss9jo; 
and Terra, “Oposición pide juicio político de ministro De Vido por 'caso del maletín',” undated, downloaded 
November 3, 2010, available at http://www.terra.com.ve/actualidad/articulo/html/act1444015.htm. 
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Fifth, key institutions of relevance to foreign investors have been undermined by recent 
governments in Argentina. Beyond the aforementioned interference with the official 
statistical agency (INDEC), it is worth recalling that the central bank has been 
manhandled and the country’s privately-managed pension funds have been 
nationalized, with each case illustrating prominent instances of abuse of executive 
authority and of interventionist policies. Earlier this year, President Fernández de 
Kirchner signed an executive order telling the central bank to transfer $6.6 billion to the 
government, and when the bank’s president, Martín Redrado, refused because his legal 
counsel advised him that the central bank charter allowed him to transfer funds only 
with congressional approval, he was fired. A judge later reinstated Mr. Redrado, 
because, according to said charter, President Fernández de Kirchner likewise did not 
have the power to dismiss a central bank president without congressional authorization. 
In the end, the legislature approved the transfer of funds and Mr. Redrado’s 
replacement, but the whole episode demonstrated vividly how institutions relevant to the 
country’s financial stability and creditworthiness have been intimidated or trampled.33
 
 
The country’s private pension funds were nationalized in late 2008 under the guise of 
“saving” them from losses related to the downturn in world financial markets in the wake 
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The government’s initiative was duly passed by the 
legislature, but ever since then the pension funds have become buyers of first resort of 
the government’s obligations, such that nearly two-thirds of their holdings are 
government bonds. The bonds they purchase carry very low interest rates, which is 
expedient for the government but not for would-be pensioners.34
 
 The nationalization of 
the pension funds has therefore undermined the development of Argentina’s capital 
markets and promises to impoverish pensioners over time. 
A final element is to consider where Argentina ranks according to various criteria that 
have some relevance to the assessment of a country’s creditworthiness. For example, 
according to The World Bank’s Doing Business 2011 report, Argentina ranks in 115th 
place in the “Ease of Doing Business” category, out of a total of 183 economies.35 The 
country comes out in 87th place in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report 2010-2011, out of a total of 139 economies.36 Argentina ranks in 105th place, out 
of 178 countries, in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.37 
And in the Heritage Foundation-Wall Street Journal 2010 Index of Economic Freedom, 
Argentina is in 135th place, out of 179 countries.38
 
  
                                                 
33 Eliana Raszewski, “Paying Debt With Reserves Puts Fernandez Ally at Argentina's Central Bank,” Bloomberg 
News, September 22, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-23/paying-debt-with-reserves-
puts-fernandez-ally-at-argentina-s-central-bank.html. 
34 Ismael Bermúdez, “El Gobierno se financia cada vez más con plata de la ANSES,” iEco-Clarín, June 30, 2010, 
available at http://www.ieco.clarin.com/economia/Gobierno-financia-vez-plata-jubilaciones_0_144900005.html. 
35 See http://doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/argentina. 
36 See http://www.weforum.org/documents/GCR10/Full%20rankings.pdf. 
37 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 
38 See http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking.aspx. 
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Figure 12: Argentina's Ranking as per Different Surveys 
 
 
 
* On this scale, 100 is the highest (best) score and 0 is the lowest (worst) score. 
Source: World Bank, World Economic Forum, Transparency International and Heritage Foundation. 
 
 
The message conveyed by the uniformly low rankings obtained by Argentina – as can 
be seen in Figure 12, on average it ranks in the bottom third of countries as per these 
four surveys – is that the country is a relatively unfriendly, uncompetitive, opaque and 
repressed place in which to invest or do other business. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, should Argentina be welcomed back by the international capital markets? All 
things considered, the answer is negative. Despite the allure of high yields, investors 
and financial intermediaries are well advised to approach Argentine fixed-income and 
equity investment and trading opportunities with extreme caution, because they embody 
substantial market and default risks. Notwithstanding an impressive economic recovery, 
the country’s ability to service its financial obligations remains quite limited, and the 
government’s attitude toward official and private creditors, as well as toward court 
judgments and arbitral awards, remains one of contempt. The country is ranked 
uniformly low in various measures of the business climate, competitiveness, 
transparency, corruption and economic liberty. Therefore, Argentina – including its 
sovereign, sub-sovereign and most corporate issuers – is classified correctly as a very 
risky, single-B credit by the leading rating agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Rank on
Argentina's number of 0-100
rank countries Scale*
Doing Business 115 183 39
Competitiveness Report 87 139 37
Corruption Perceptions 105 178 41
Economic Freedom 135 179 25
Average 35
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Argentina remains an outlier in the community of nations. It is the only nation in the G-
20 group of countries that is in protracted default on its financial obligations to its fellow 
members. It is the only country in the G-20 that refuses to abide by its treaty obligations 
to the International Monetary Fund. It is the only member of the G-20 to have received a 
“thumbs down” from the leading governmental organization that sets and monitors 
standards to combat transnational financial crimes. It is the G-20 member with by far the 
most investor claims against it in the world’s premier dispute resolution center. The 
country’s conduct is, in sum, an embarrassment to the otherwise honorable members of 
the G20 assemblage of countries. 
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